The study examines, what forms and instruments firms use to react flexibly to demand-induced output fluctuations, and, if they are used in a complementary or substitutable way. Empirical evidence shows a rather complementary relationship. Moreover, the determinants of temporary employment (fixed-term contracts and temporary agency work) and the impact of these flexible employment forms on job security and job stability of regular employment are analyzed. One result is that positive developments of sales covary with a higher probability and more wide-spread use of temporary employment, which concurs with dual labour market theory. But estimations for job security and job stability indicate that temporary employment does not lower the number of layoffs and quits as is proposed by the core-periphery hypothesis.
Introduction
Economic, social, and technological changes make it necessary for firms to adjust flexibly to sustain their business. Technical progress and new demand structures do not only lead to new products and production methods, but also to even faster employment adjustments concerning the quantity and the quality of labour. De-industrialisation and the knowledge-based economy go hand in hand with a higher labour force participation of women and a worse labour market position for low qualified workers. Globalization and European integration lead to more competitive pressure and a discussion about the choice of location for company plants. Of course this has consequences for aggregate employment and employees, e.g., unemployment, new work practices, and new employment relationships (Walker et al. 2000; Charness/Levine 2002) . Hence, much attention is devoted to labour market flexibility (Brodsky 1994) . This paper will focus on three research questions, which are shortly discussed in the following paragraphs.
(1) What forms and instruments do firms use to react flexible to demandinduced output fluctuation?
adjustments (e.g., layoffs, hiring). Functional flexibility comprises instruments, which can help to adjust output without numerical flexibility like layoffs. An example of internal instruments of functional flexibilty is the in-house transfer of employees and of external forms is subcontracting with other firms.
The relationships between the different forms of flexibility and the instruments within a given form can be complementary or substitutable. If there are advantages in specialization and decreasing marginal costs (economies of scales), the forms or instruments should be substitutes. In the case of increasing marginal costs and decreasing marginal revenue, which is more likely from an economic point of view, the utilisation of forms and instruments should be complementary. Furthermore, due to fixed employment costs, investments in firm specific human capital, and long-term work incentives, firms are often interested in stable employment relationships (Gerlach/Jirjahn 1999; Bellmann/Alda 2004) . If this is true, strategies to avoid external adjustments are superior. Because of restrictions of internal flexibility (e.g., working hours, Instruments of external numerical flexibility are used to adjust employment to the profit maximizing level. Regular employment has relative high adjustment costs. In addition to fixed employment costs (e.g., administration costs for hiring), investments in firm specific human capital, and long-term incentives (e.g., seniority wages), these adjustment costs include separation costs due to institutional employment protection (e.g., severance pay). This makes it attractive for firms to use a peripheral workforce, which has lower adjustment costs and can be adjusted faster than the core workforce (Bentolila/Saint-Paul consists of contingent work with fixed-term and temporary agency employment. 1 For example, the administration costs for temporary agency work are lower because the agency has to cover these costs and the firm only transfers a fee.
Further, temporary employees generally have low levels of firm specific human capital and weaker employment protection (OECD 2004: 61-125) .
These insights are important for dual labour market theory (Biehler et al. 1979; Sengenberger 1979; Dickens/Lang 1992; Leontaridi 1998) . Most models of dual labour markets have two things in common: (1) The labour market can be vertically divided in two segments. The primary labour market includes the core workforce with high wages, high promotion possibilities, good working conditions, high levels of firm specific human capital, and employment security.
The secondary labour market comprises the peripheral workforce lacking the privileges of the core workforce. The mobility between these two labour markets is limited. While the first labour market is characterized by job competition, there is wage competition in the second labour market. (2) Furthermore, the core workforce can be subdivided in an upper and lower segment. The employees in the upper segment are in general experts and managers. The typical workforce in the lower segment are the traditional industry jobs requiring firm specific human capital. This paper concentrates on internal dual labour markets (Rebitzer/Taylor 1991; 6 with low monitoring costs prefer a peripheral workforce. This however, does not yet lead to an internal dual labour market, in which both workforces are employed by one firm. Such internal dual labour markets only emerge in the case of demand uncertainty. Because a firm can pay lower efficiency wages to get the same level of effort if it lowers the cyclical and structural layoff probability of the core workforce, it is profit maximizing to hoard the core workforce in bad economic states and to use a flexible peripheral workforce to adjust employment. Furthermore, good working conditions and employment security should lower quits among the core employees saving employment costs. Hence, the core workforce has higher employment stability due to the use of a peripheral workforce.
According to median voter models, unions and works councils shoud have an interest in protecting the core workforces' privileges. Therefore, they should favour an internal dual labour market and the use of temporary employment.
However, because of a feasible substitution of core employees by peripheral employees and a loss of insider power, they are aware of a too intense utilisation of temporary employment (Watzka 2000: 43) . Atkinson (1987: 99) reports evidence for England that national unions oppose a higher level of employment flexibility and local unions favour the initiatives of a firm's management. In Germany the local presence is taken by works councils, while unions are actors on an industry, district, or economy level.
To complete the background of flexible employment, some information about the institutional settings of fixed-term contracts and temporary agency work in Germany is provided in the following paragraphs. In January 2001 the regulation of fixed-term contracts was renewed ("Gesetz über Teilzeitarbeit und befristete Arbeitsverträge") (Viethen 2001) . The new legislation includes the prohibition of discrimination at the workplace, which refers to equal pay and treatment. Moreover, the abuse of consecutive fixed-term contracts is restricted to avoid a substitution of regular employment. Thus, fixed-term contracts without an objective reason are only allowed up to 24 months for newly hired employees, i.e., the employees must not to be in the firm at any time before this contract. Within these 24 months only up to three renewals of a contract are 
Data and method
The Hannover Establishment Panel is the sample for Lower Saxony from the German IAB establishment panel (Bellmann 2002; Gerlach et al. 2003) . Every year approximately one thousand establishments from Lower Saxony with at least one employee covered by social security are interviewed in a panel design survey. The sample can be weighted for all of the nearly 200.000 establishments in Lower Saxony, which has approximately the same employment and establishment structure as West Germany. The empirical analysis is divided in three parts, one for every research question. employment on job security and job stability is analyzed using estimations for layoffs, quits, and the separation rate, which is calculated by the proportion of layoffs and quits to non-temporary employees. For layoffs and quits the dependent variable is the log number so that OLS can be applied. The separation rate is estimated by tobit because there are censored observations.
The explanatory variables in all three regressions are the same as in (2). In addition, dummy variables are included for tremendous establishment changes (part of the establishment closed, hived off, or integrated within the last year).
Empirical evidence

Forms and instruments of flexibility
In the weighted sample 26% of all establishments had output fluctuations in 2002 (32% in the unweighted sample). Table 1 informs about the utilisation and importance of the single instruments and forms of flexibility establishments used to cope with these fluctuations. While there were multiple answers possible for utilization, only a single instrument could be rated as the most important one.
The dominant flexibility form is internal numerical flexibility. About 74% of the firms use at least one of the instruments within this form. The most important instruments of this type are overtime/ extra shifts and holidays/ free days, which are each used by half of the firms and rated by about 20% as the most important instruments overall. They are followed by flexible work schedules and short time. While the use of flexible work schedules is quite strong (21%) and important (11%), short time is only used by 7%. This is, because the introduction of short time is strongly regulated and can only be used in really bad economic states and if the federal employment agencies permit short time.
Nearly one third of the firms use at least one instrument of external numerical flexibility. Layoffs and hiring are used by 23% and rated as the most important instrument by 11%. There is quite a large gap between layoffs/ hiring and the use of temporary employment forms. Fixed-term contracts are used by 8% and temporary agency work by 5%. While 4% of the firms rate fixed-term contracts as the most important instrument, temporary agency work seems relatively unimportant (see section 4.2. for a further discussion of temporary employment).
About 40% of the firms use at least one instrument of internal functional flexibility. One quarter varies its stock sales, while 14% vary the delivery time.
In-house transfers are used by only 12%, but it is rated as the most important instrument within functional flexibility. Subcontracting as an instrument of external functional flexibility is used by 5% and only a few firms rate it as the most important instrument.
.
Table 1: Firms' use of forms and instruments of flexibility in Lower Saxony
Probit estimates for the utilisation of the different forms of flexibility (table 2) The estimates show also that the existence of a works council has positive influence on the probability of using flexibility, which is especially the case for internal flexibility. Works councils seem to support rather than hinder flexibility.
However, this result should be interpreted with some caution, since it could be caused by the fact that firms with a works council are more likely to have output fluctuations. No significant effects are found for the existence of a collective agreement and for the employer size. Sector dummies indicate that firms in the production and building sector make stronger use of numerical flexibility, and that internal functional flexibility is more likely to be used in the production, trading, and repairing sector. 
Determinants of temporary employment
The development of fixed-term contracts in the weighted sample is moderately positive (table 6) . In every year more firms make use of fixed-term contracts.
But the share of fixed-term employment in total employment is relatively constant over time. To summarize, nearly every fifth firm uses fixed-term employment, but only every twentieth employee has a fixed-term contract. The utilisation of temporary agency work is even lower. Only two to three percent of all firms use temporary agency work and only one percent of all employees are temporary agency workers. An explanation for the relatively minor utilisation in the last years could be the overall bad economic situation in Germany, which did not lead to the demand for additional employment. Moreover, the results show that fixed-term contracts and temporary agency work are complements, which verifies the result in section 4.1. There is also a complementary relation with part-time employment, which can be seen as part of the peripheral workforce (Tilly 1992) . The probability of using fixed-term contracts is positively related with the share of women in the firm because fixedterm employment can be used as temporary replacement during pregnancy and maternity leave (Hagen/Boockmann 2002) . Because of shortcomings in qualifications, fixed-term employees are not good matches and not perfect substitutes for qualified workers. Hence, the finding is not surprising that a higher share of qualified employees is related with a less likely and intense use of fixed-term contracts.
The results also support the findings by Boockmann and Hagen (2003) and Pfeifer (2005) that the existence of a works council increases the probability of the utilisation of fixed-term contracts but lowers the intensity. This evidence corresponds with dual labour market theory, which predicts that the core workforce, represented by works councils, gains higher job security due to temporary employment. The works council also protects the core employees against substitution. Collective agreements do not have any significant effects.
The control variables demonstrate that the use of fixed-term employment is more likely and more intense in the service sector. The time trend in table 6 is also confirmed: significantly more firms use fixed-term contracts, but the intensity does not change. (internal numerical flexibility). As has already been discussed in section 4.1., internal numerical and external numerical flexibility are used as substitutes.
Bellman (2004) found the same employment structure variables to be significant.
A significant influence of works councils and collective agreements as in Pfeifer (2005) cannot be found. The signs however, are in the (theoretically) correct direction, i.e., they make the utilisation more likely but decrease the intensity.
The control variables show that temporary agency work is more likely to be 
Job security and job stability
The core-periphery hypothesis predicts that the core workforce has a higher degree of job security and job stability if the firm uses the peripheral workforce as a buffer. Therefore, a higher share of fixed-term employment and temporary agency work should lead to fewer layoffs and quits. Hence, temporary employment lowers the separation rate among the regular employees. The results are presented in table 9.
Naturally, there are more employer-induced separations (layoffs) if the expected development of sales for the current year is negative. The impact of temporary employment on separations is only significant for fixed-term employment in the regressions for quits and the separation rate. Overall, the correlation is positive, i.e., temporary employment and separations are used as complements.
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Furthermore, there is evidence that blue-collar employees are more strongly exposed to layoffs and qualified employees are less likely to quit. This is plausible since blue-collar and low qualified employees are of less value to the firm and can be dismissed or replaced more easily. Works councils and collective agreements significantly reduce the number of layoffs. Both institutions try to protect the core workforce from job insecurity and are associated with higher adjustment costs. The number of quits is also lower if a works council or a collective agreement exists. However, the coefficient is only significant for works councils, which favours the view that the voice function in Germany is implemented by works councils rather than by unions (Frick 1996) .
The control variables for industries show that firms from the building sector have more layoffs and a higher separation rate. Firms in the production sector experience fewer quits. The time trend indicates fewer layoffs in the year 2004 than in the two prior years. The number of quits has also decreased. Although the considerations of dual labour market theory could be confirmed in section 4.2., we found no support for the core-periphery hypothesis in this section. Layoffs and temporary employment are used complementary, which is in line with the results in section 4.1. Cappelli and Neumark (2004: 175-176) also report a positive correlation between involuntary turnover and the use of contingent work, which contradicts the core-periphery hypothesis. However, it cannot be rejected that firms make use of a core and a peripheral workforce in the sense of dual labour markets.
Conclusion
This Nevertheless, this study presents some theoretical and -even more importantempirically based insights of the utilisation of flexibility and especially of external numerical instruments like temporary employment and layoffs. Firm uses at least one instrument of external functional flexibility: 5%
Weighted frequencies for utilisation (importance) of instruments.
Multiple mentions for utilisation of instruments so that they do not add to 100%. Single mentions for importance of instruments so that they add to 100%. -106.81 -195.13 -184.36 -88.63 Marginal effects for change in probability. Standard errors in italics. Significant at the * 10%-, ** 5%-, or *** 1%-level. -159.64 -174.10 -146.30 -114.56 Marginal effects for change in probability. Standard errors in italics. Significant at the * 10%-, ** 5%-, or *** 1%-level. 1445.00 OLS for log number of layoffs and quits. Tobit for separation rate. Standard errors in italics. Significant at the * 10%-, ** 5%-, or *** 1%-level.
